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Abstract
This study addresses an apparent disconnect between two views of strategic action: the “economic view,”
which contends that industry structure is the primary influence on strategic action, and the “cognitive view,”
which suggests that managerial cognition drives strategic action. We argue that this disconnect has created artificial boundaries between the two perspectives and has limited our ability to develop holistic explanations of
strategic action. In response, we develop an integrated model that answers two questions: 1) Does industry context affect managerial cognition? 2) Does managerial cognition mediate the relationship between industry context and strategic responses to environmental changes? To examine these questions, we study the relationship
between industry velocity, the structure of top management’s cognitive representation of the environment, and
the speed of response to environmental events. We find that industry velocity influences the structure of cognitive representations, which in turn influence the speed of response to environmental events. These results support our contention that both industry and cognition variables are critical in developing explanations of strategic actions. These results have implications for our understanding of the development of top managers’ beliefs,
the relationship between beliefs and action, and the nature of the complex relationship between industry context, managerial cognition, and strategic action.
Keywords: attention, causal logic, cognition, environment, strategic action, velocity

veloping a complete understanding of their environments (Bogner and Barr, 2000; Daft and Weick, 1984;
Fiol and O’Connor, 2003). Instead, top managers develop subjective representations of the environment
that, in turn, drive their strategic decisions and subsequent firm action. The two camps have progressed
along independent lines; industry structure has focused on cross-industry differences in strategic actions, downplaying the role of cognition, whereas the
managerial cognition view has focused on the role of
cognition in determining strategic actions within a
single industry, giving little attention to the nature of
that industry. Because each camp focuses on distinct
explanations of strategic actions, we believe that a
disconnect between the two views has created artifi-

Introduction
The question of what drives strategic action has occupied a central position in the strategic management
literature. Although several explanations of strategic action have been developed, two views have been
particularly dominant—industry structure and managerial cognition. The industry structure view assumes
complete rationality on the part of strategic decision
makers and contends that industry structure influences the timing and effectiveness of strategic actions
(Bain, 1956; Caves, Fortunato, and Ghemawat, 1984;
Ghemawat, 1991; Mason, 1957; Porter, 1985). In contrast, the managerial cognition literature suggests that
bounded rationality prevents top managers from de1395
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cial boundaries between industry structure and managerial cognition as drivers of strategic action. These
boundaries have, in turn, severely inhibited the development of comprehensive and integrated explanations of strategic action.
Recent studies have suggested that an integration
of the industry structure and managerial cognition
views may lead to a better and more complete explanation of strategic action (Johnson and Hoopes,
2003). For example, while cognitive boundedness
prohibits the perfect rationality suggested by the industry structure view (Simon, 1991), the exogenous
economic characteristics of industries do exist independently of managers’ beliefs about them and “can
force industry members to accept a reality that they
might not have enacted on their own” (Johnson and
Hoopes, 2003: 1,057). This suggests that a relationship between industry structure and managerial
cognition may exist and may explain strategic action
better than either perspective can on its own. Further, this connection brings to the foreground an assumption often implied, but not tested, in the cognition literature: that industry influences facets of
managerial cognition, which affects how managers
make sense of and act within their environments.
If this is true, then it suggests that cognition mediates the relationship between industry context and
strategic action. To investigate this possibility, this
study addresses two questions:
● Does industry context affect managerial cognition
about environments?
● Does managerial cognition mediate the relationship
between industry context and strategic action?
We address these questions by focusing on top
managers’ subjective representations of their firms’
operating environments. Both the strategic choice
(Child, 1972) and upper echelon views (Hambrick
and Mason, 1984) argue that top managers bring together and interpret information for the firm as a
whole. Many may participate in scanning or data
processing, but the point at which information converges and is interpreted for organizational-level
action is presumed to be at the top manager level
(Daft and Weick, 1984; Lyles and Schwenk, 1992;
Prahalad and Bettis, 1986; Thomas, Clark, and Gioia,
1993). How top managers construct their environments has been argued to both influence which environmental events attract the attention of strategic
decision makers and which events are selectively ig-
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nored in strategic decision making, as well as the nature of the response to environmental events (Bogner and Barr, 2000; Daft and Weick, 1984; Fiol and
O’Connor, 2003). In other words, subjective representations that top managers develop about their
environments help define the firm’s strategic agenda
(Dutton and Jackson, 1987).
We examine differences in two forms of subjective representations that top managers develop
about environments—attention focus (the aspects of
the environment that are central to top managers’
subjective representations of their environments)
and environment-strategy causal logics (the order of
the perceived causal relationship between the external environment and firm strategy). Attention
focus about the environment is important because
it influences the degree of mindful attention that
will be directed to a given environmental event
(Weick, 1995) and influences the likelihood that
any given environmental event will make it onto
the firm’s strategic agenda (Cho and Hambrick,
2006; Dutton and Jackson, 1987; Huff, 1990). Causal
logics, on the other hand, are the primary basis for
decision making in general (Fiske and Taylor, 1991)
and have been found to influence the way in which
strategic decisions are made, understood, and communicated (Huff, 1990).
We examine attention focus and causal logics of
top managers in two different industry contexts:
high velocity (semiconductor and cosmetic industries) and low velocity (aircraft and petrochemical
industries). We propose that industry velocity will
influence attention focus and causal logics that, in
turn, will influence the speed of strategic action responses to major environmental changes. In other
words, attention focus and causal logics will mediate the relationship between industry velocity and
speed of strategic action responses to environmental changes. Our study provides unique insights on
how the industry and cognitive views collectively
explain strategic action.

Theory Development and Hypotheses
Overview of theoretical model
We present our theoretical model in Figure 1. The
central contention of our model is that attention focus and causal logics that top managers develop
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velop subjective representations of their environment that provide a lens through which they view
the current events and activities and make strategic
decisions. Thus it is these top managers’ subjective
cognitive representations, and not the objective environments, that directly affect a firm’s strategic priorities and drive decision making. We focus on two
forms of subjective representations that top managers develop about their environment—attention focus
and environment-strategy causal logics.
Attention focus
Figure 1. Theoretical model of industry velocity, managerial cognition, and speed of strategic responses

will mediate the relationship between industry velocity and strategic actions. We propose that as top
managers make sense of, learn from, and address
the unique cognitive challenges embedded in the
velocity of their operating environments, they will
develop specific attention focus and causal logics about their environments. Further, drawing on
the managerial cognition literature (Barr and Huff,
1997; Bogner and Barr, 2000; Chakravarthy, 1982;
Cho and Hambrick, 2006; Daft and Weick, 1984;
Lant, Milliken, and Batra, 1992; Simon, 1991; Weick,
1995), we propose that top managers’ attention focus and causal logics will act as a filter in determining how top managers notice and respond to major
environmental changes in their operating environments. Firms will not respond to raw environmental
changes unless they notice these variables and interpret how these variables affect their firm. Thus, industry velocity will not affect strategic actions directly; rather attention focus and causal logics will
mediate the relationship between industry velocity
and strategic actions.
Attention focus and causal logics
The strategic choice and psychosocial views of organizations (Child, 1972; Weick, 1995) suggest that
cognitive limits preclude top managers from developing a complete understanding of their environments (Bogner and Barr, 2000; Daft and Weick, 1984;
Fiol and O’Connor, 2003). Instead, top managers de-

Attention focus refers to the degree to which top
managers’ subjective representations of their external environment are dominated by concepts related
to one (or more) domain over others. Top managers
are bombarded with a vast amount of strategic information that often exceeds their cognitive capacity (Simon, 1991). One way to deal with this cognitive overload is through the process of selective attention. Top
managers focus their attention on those domains that
they deem to be most relevant while selectively ignoring others (Bogner and Barr, 2000; Daft and Weick,
1984; Fiol and O’Connor, 2003; Hambrick and Mason,
1984; Starbuck and Milliken, 1988). Attention focus is
important because it provides a filter through which
top managers identify issues.
Despite its importance, attention focus remains
under-researched. Most literature in this area is theoretical and highlights the impact of firm context
(Cho and Hambrick, 2006; Ocasio, 1997) and past
performance (March and Shapira, 1992) on the attention focus of managers. For example, Ocasio
(1997) theorized that firms’ communication and procedural channels (e.g., action memoranda, personnel
evaluation, budgetary and capital appropriations requests) affect the attention of decision makers. Cho
and Hambrick (2006) examined the mediating effects of attention patterns in the relationship between top management characteristics and strategic
change. In their simulation study, March and Shapira (1992) found that firm resources and past performance affect the attention focus of firms. The impact of environment on attention focus has not been
addressed in previous research, despite the fact that
the relationship between strategy and external environment is highlighted as a central feature in strategy research.
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Attention focus can be directed toward the external environment (e.g., competition, regulations,
macroeconomic factors, technology) or internal organizational context (e.g., organizational structures,
resources, policies and procedures, communication
channels). In this study, we examine attention focus directed toward the external environment. Top
managers’ attention focus toward external environment is important because it influences the degree of
mindful attention that will be directed to a given environmental event (Weick, 1995) and determines the
likelihood that any given environmental event will
make it onto the firm’s strategic agenda and will be
responded to (Dutton and Jackson, 1987).
The strategy literature has identified two sectors
of environment to which firms attend—task and general (Bourgeois, 1980; Daft, Sormunen, and Parks,
1988; Garg, Walters, and Priem, 2003). The task sector includes those aspects of the environment that
have direct transactions with the firm such as competitors, suppliers, and customers, while the general sector includes more macro-level dimensions
such as social, demographic, economic, and political. Previous studies show that top managers differ in their relative emphasis on each sector in strategic decision making (Bourgeois, 1980; Daft et al.,
1988), thereby highlighting the usefulness of this dichotomy for examining attention focus in subjective
representations of the environment. Moreover, differences in attention focus across these two sectors
have been found to have implications for strategic
action (Garg et al., 2003).
Environment-strategy causal logics
Causal reasoning is the primary basis for decision
making in general (Fiske and Taylor, 1991) and has
been found to influence the way in which strategic decisions are made, understood, and communicated (Huff, 1990). Of particular importance to
strategic decision making are top managers’ beliefs regarding the causal relationship between environment and strategy. In the course of decision
making, top managers generate beliefs that relate
various environmental and strategy concepts together in a causal manner. These cause-effect beliefs about the environment-strategy relationship
frame specific strategic issues and affect how they
are interpreted and what strategic actions are initiated (Barr, Stimpert, and Huff, 1992; Barr and Huff,
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1997; Dutton, Fahey, and Narayanan, 1983; Eden,
Ackermann, and Cropper, 1992; Priem, 1994; Stubbart, 1989). In short, raw signals from the environment are not addressed until top managers interpret their causal relationship with the firm (Huff,
1990; Dutton et al., 1983).
Daft and Weick (1984) differentiate between environment-driven and interpretation-driven causeeffect beliefs about the environment. In environment-driven frames, top managers experience
environments as concrete, hard, measurable, and
determinant. They therefore first seek to identify environmental demands and then develop strategies
in response to them. Top managers thus assume the
environment to determine strategy. Such environment → strategy beliefs represent deterministic logics (Fahey and Narayanan, 1989). On the other hand,
top managers of firms confronting more unstable or unanalyzable environments are thought “to
construct, coerce, or enact a reasonable interpretation that makes previous action sensible” (Daft and
Weick, 1984: 287, emphasis added). Thus, they attempt to construct their environments through their
strategies rather than developing strategies in response to environments (Lyles and Schwenk, 1992),
resulting in strategy → environment beliefs, or proactive logics (Fahey and Narayanan, 1989).
Industry velocity, attention focus, and causal logics
Extant research contends that subjective cognitive
representations that top managers develop about
their environments are the result of making sense
of, learning from, and addressing the unique cognitive challenges embedded in their operating environments (Daft and Weick, 1984; Fiske and Taylor,
1991; Reger and Palmer, 1996; Osborne, Stubbart,
and Ramaprasad, 2001). For example, Bogner and
Barr (2000) argued that through the process of making sense of and responding to the cognitive challenges embedded in the hypercompetitive environments, top managers in hypercompetitive industries
develop cognitive representations that are significantly different from those held by top managers
from firms operating in more stable environments.
Further, empirical evidence suggests that managerial perceptions may vary across industry contexts (Keats and Hitt, 1988; Lant et al., 1992; Priem,
1994; Snyder and Glueck, 1982; Sutcliffe and Huber,
1998), which implies that industry context may in-
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fluence the cognition of top managers. However,
the link between industry context and cognition of
top managers has not been explicitly tested in a systematic way.
One facet of industry context that has created
much interest in both the academic and practitioner-oriented literature on strategic management is
industry velocity (Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1988;
Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000), variously referred to as industry cycle
(Williams, 1994), and industry clockspeed (Fines,
1998). Industry velocity reflects the speed (frequency of changes and the time span of intervals
between these changes) (Duncan, 1972; Jurkovich,
1974; Tung, 1979) and unpredictability of changes
in industry variables (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997;
Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). High velocity industries are characterized by rapid and unpredictable
changes in product and process technologies and
competitors’ strategic actions that make it difficult
for top managers of incumbent firms to develop a
clear and comprehensive understanding of their environment. In contrast, the inherent stability of low
velocity industries allows top managers in incumbent firms to gradually build and improve their understanding of the environment through systematic
scanning approaches. Thus, high and low velocity
industries pose different cognitive challenges to top
managers in incumbent firms.
We propose that the differences in cognitive
challenges embedded in high and low velocity industries will lead to differences in the nature of interactions and learning that top managers in incumbent firms engage in and result in different
forms of attention focus and causal logics held by
top managers of firms in high and low velocity
contexts. These differences in attention focus and
causal logics will, in turn, affect how quickly they
respond to major environmental changes. In other
words, top managers’ attention focus and causal
logics will act as filters and mediate the relationship between industry velocity and speed of strategic response.
In this section, we integrate the managerial cognition literature (Bogner and Barr, 2000; Daft and
Weick, 1984; Dutton et al., 1983) and the industry velocity literature (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Fines, 1998) to develop hypotheses that link industry velocity with attention
focus and causal logics about environment.
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Industry velocity and attention focus
Salience is what causes some environmental cues to
draw more attention than others. Research on cognition, including cognition in organizations, demonstrates that the level of salience of any given social cue is linked to the degree to which it is novel
in context, deviates from expectations, or is goal
relevant (Fiske and Taylor, 1991; Sutcliffe and Huber, 1998). Thus, elements of the operating environment that are expected to capture the attention of
top managers are those that are unusual for the environment (e.g., a new competitor in an industry
with high barriers to entry), that differ from managerial expectations (e.g., an unanticipated drop in
customer demand), or that are perceived as relevant to the attainment of organizational goals (especially elements perceived as significant to organizational performance). Theoretical and empirical
work in the strategy and organizations literatures
make a similar argument—environmental sectors
characterized by strong cues in the form of high
levels of uncertainty (unusual for environment or
different from expectation) (Daft et al., 1988; Duncan, 1972; Garg et al., 2003), and hostility (goal relevance) (Daft and Weick, 1984) draw the attention
of top managers. For example, Daft et al. (1988)
found that when sector uncertainty was high, executives reported greater frequency of scanning (i.e.,
attention).
We expect task sector to be less salient in low velocity environments than in high velocity industries.
This is because in low velocity task sectors, changes
occur along roughly predictable and linear paths
(Bogner and Barr, 2000; Eisenhardt and Martin,
2000). They have relatively stable industry structures
such that market boundaries are clear and the players (e.g., suppliers, competitors, customers, complementers) are well known and rarely change so top
managers in incumbent firms rarely face task sector
events that are unusual or unexpected. The top managers of firms in low velocity industries also face relatively less hostile task sectors because their firms
can protect existing core competencies and achieve
sustainable competitive advantage by building isolating mechanisms that retard imitations (Garg et al.,
2003; Williams, 1994).
In contrast to low velocity environments, the task
sectors in high velocity environments are characterized by nonlinear and unpredictable changes (Bog-
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ner and Barr, 2000; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000).
In high velocity industries, market boundaries are
blurred, successful business models are unclear,
and market players (i.e., buyers, suppliers, competitors, complementers) are ambiguous and shifting
(D’Aveni, 1994). Top managers of firms in high velocity environments also face high levels of competitive hostility; building sustainable competitive
advantage is difficult because firms cannot protect existing products and processes for a long time
(Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Fines, 1998; Williams,
1994) and, therefore, firms cannot sustain above-average profits based on a single established innovation or advantage. As top managers of firms in high
velocity environments consistently address the fast
changing, hostile, and unpredictable changes in
the task sectors by introducing new products and/
or process technologies faster (Nerkar and Roberts,
2004; Cottrell and Nault, 2004) and carry out frequent strategic and organizational changes (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Eisenhardt, 1989; Fines,
1998), task sector cues are likely to dominate subjective representations of their operating environment.
In sum the stronger salience of task sector in high
velocity environments is likely to result in greater
dominance of task sector concepts in subjective representations of the environment, whereas the weaker
salience of the task sector in low velocity environments will lead to lower levels of attention focus on
task sector in managers’ subjective representations.
We therefore expect that:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Industry velocity will positively
affect top managers’ attention focus on the task
sector.
Due to the predictability and stability of the task sector in low velocity environments, top managers are
likely to direct their attention to changes in general
sector (such as recession, wars, regulatory, and political), which they may consider to be less predictable and linear. Thus, general sector is likely to create greater levels of uncertainty and hostility than
do changes in their task sector (Garg et al., 2003) and
to motivate top managers to direct their time and
effort toward scanning it. As these managers consistently direct their scanning activities toward the
general sector, they will, over time, develop an attention focus bias toward it (Dearborn and Simon,
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1958; March and Simon, 1958). On the other hand,
the general sector is likely to be less salient than the
task sector for top managers of firms in high velocity environments due to the high level of uncertainty
and change in the task sector. The weaker salience
of the general sector is likely to lead top managers in high velocity environments to direct less attention to it. In other words, all things being equal,
the subjective representations top managers of firms
in low velocity environments hold of their environments are likely to have direct greater attention focus on general sector than those of firms in high velocity environments.
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Industry velocity will negatively
affect top managers’ attention focus on the general
sector.

Industry velocity and strategy-environment causal logic
Daft and Weick (1984) suggest that the degree to
which strategy-environment causal logics held by
top managers are proactive (strategy → environment) or deterministic (environment → strategy)
is at least partly a function of the nature of the industry itself. Of particular influence is the degree
to which environments are predictable or analyzable in the form of well-defined trends in customer
demands and clearly defined industry structures.
Where “predictable uniformities in relationship
among significant objects” exist and accurate forecasts are available, top managers view the environment as “analyzable” and develop strategies that fit
their environment (Daft and Weick, 1984: 287). In
environments where relationships are less predictable, top managers experience the environment as
“unanalyzable” and seek “to construct, coerce, or
enact a reasonable interpretation that makes previous action sensible and suggests some next steps”
(Daft and Weick, 1984: 287).
High velocity environments reflect rapid, frequent
environmental change that continually disrupts the
competitive structure of the industry (D’Aveni, 1994;
Eisenhardt, 1989). Forecasts are not possible and statistical trends do not correlate with key strategy indicators (Aguilar, 1967). Further, traditional anchors
of sense-making such as well-defined competitors,
established channels of distribution, and customer
groups do not exist (Bogner and Barr, 2000). In these
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industries, top managers actively seek to make sense
of their environment by engaging in action and seeing what happens (Weick, 1995). They experiment,
test, and probe (Eisenhardt, 1989). As top managers
of these firms actively construct and enact their environments through experimentation and innovative strategies, they are likely to develop proactive
logics (strategy → environment).
In contrast, low velocity environments are characterized by linear and predictable changes (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Fines, 1998; Williams,
1994), which lend themselves well to learning about
the nature of the environment and its relationship
to firm behavior (Daft and Weick, 1984). Further,
clearly established and well-defined industry and
competitive structures in the form of competitors,
channels of distribution, product markets, and so
on exist and remain relatively invariant. Since unpredictable changes in these industries are less frequent, top managers of incumbent firms are likely
to view the environment as analyzable and something that firms need to adjust to. Therefore, as top
managers of firms in low velocity industries systematically analyze, learn from, and respond to
their operating environments, they are likely to develop more deterministic causal logics (environment → strategy).
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Industry velocity will positively
affect the level of top managers’ proactive causal
logics.
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Industry velocity will negatively
affect the level of top managers’ deterministic causal
logics.
The mediating role of attention focus and causal logics
In this section, we propose that top managers’ attention focus and causal logics will mediate the relationship between environment and strategic action outcomes. We also hypothesize the nature of
the mediation. We use speed of strategic response as
a strategic action outcome because its implications
for firm survival and success make it an outcome of
interest for strategy scholars. The strategy literature
has consistently prescribed the importance of aligning firm strategies with opportunities and threats in
the environment (Andrews, 1987; Ginsberg, 1988;
Miles and Snow, 1972; Mintzberg, 1972; Porter,
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1985; Quinn, 1980; Hofer and Schendel, 1978). Further, research has demonstrated that firms that initiate timely strategic responses to changes in the
environment outperform those that delay in their
response (Cotrell and Nault, 2004; Haveman, 1992;
Nerkar and Roberts, 2004; Smith and Grimm, 1987;
Baum and Wally, 2003). Studies have also shown
that firms that fail to adjust in a timely fashion may
enter a downward spiral from which they do not escape (Cameron, Sutton, and Whetten, 1988; Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1988).
Cognition studies have argued that the initiation of speedy firm responses to environmental
changes is tied to top managers’ interpretations
of the environment (Barr and Huff, 1997; Bogner and Barr, 2000; Chakravarthy, 1982; Daft and
Weick, 1984; Lant et al., 1992; Simon, 1991; Weick,
1995). Dutton and Duncan (1987) suggest that “...
a major reason organizations respond differently
to changes in the environment involves how strategic issues are triggered and interpreted by decision-makers” (Dutton and Duncan, 1987: 279). As
cognitive limits preclude top managers from forming complete and accurate understandings of their
environment, it is top managers’ subjective cognitive interpretations of the environment, rather than
the objective nature of the environment itself, that
determines which external events will be noticed
and responded to. Raw signals from the environment are not addressed until firms notice these signals and interpret their causal relationship with
the firm (Huff, 1990; Dutton et al., 1983). This suggests that industry velocity will not have a direct
effect on the speed of response. Rather, attention
focus and causal logics will affect which environmental events top managers notice, how they interpret those events, and how quickly they respond
to them. In other words, attention focus and causal
logics will mediate the relationship between industry velocity and the speed of response. Hypothesis
5 (H5): Attention focus on the general sector will
mediate the relationship between industry velocity and speed of response to changes in the general
sector and the task sector.
Hypothesis 6 (H6): Attention focus on the task sector will mediate the relationship between industry velocity and speed of response to changes in the general
sector and the task sector.
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Hypothesis 7 (H7): Proactive causal logics will mediate the relationship between industry velocity and
speed of response to changes in the general sector
and the task sector.
Hypothesis 8 (H8): Deterministic causal logics will
mediate the relationship between industry velocity
and speed of response to changes in the general sector and the task sector.
In what follows, we specify the nature of mediation of attention focus and causal logics.
Attention focus
Top managers are more likely to recognize and actively attend to environmental change that takes
place in the sectors that are central to their subjective
representations of the environment than to changes
that occur in the sectors that are less central to their
representations (Lant et al., 1992; Fiol and O’Connor,
2003). When top managers fail to actively attend to
environmental changes, they are unlikely to implement strategic responses (Huff and Schwenk, 1990;
Terreberry, 1968). Further, top managers are likely
to more quickly recognize, understand, and formulate responses to changes in the sectors to which
they actively attend than to changes in sectors that
are not central to their cognitive systems. Therefore,
firms with top managers that have an attention focus on the general sector are more likely to quickly
recognize and actively attend to changes in this sector than changes in the task sector. Conversely, top
managers’ strong attention focus on task sector is
likely to promote faster response to changes in the
task sector. This suggests the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 9a (H9a): Top managers’ attention focus on the general sector will be positively related to
speed of response to changes in the general sector.
Hypothesis 9b (H9b): Top managers’ attention focus on the general sector will be negatively related to
speed of response to changes in the task sector.
Hypothesis 9c (H9c): Top managers’ attention focus
on the task sector will be positively related to speed
of response to changes in the task sector.
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Hypothesis 9d (H9d): Top managers’ attention focus
on the task sector will be negatively related to speed
of response to changes in the general sector.

Environment-strategy causal logics
Speed of response is also likely to be influenced by
the type of causal logics top managers hold about
the relationship between environment and firm behavior. Top managers with deterministic causal
logics undertake action to realign the environment-strategy fit following a change in their task or
general sectors. After the environmental change occurs, top managers with deterministic causal logics
will first try to understand what the events mean in
terms of change in environmental demands so they
can develop a proper “fit” response, and response
will follow (Wooldridge and Floyd, 1989). Developing a comprehensive understanding of a specific environmental change requires extensive intelligence
gathering and market surveillance activities (Daft
and Weick, 1984; Wooldridge and Floyd, 1989),
which requires significant time and resources. This
emphasis on getting feedback from specific environmental changes before undertaking response actions
is therefore expected to decrease the speed of strategic response to environmental changes in both the
task sector and the general sector.
Top managers with proactive causal logic do not
undertake extensive efforts to understand their environments prior to undertaking a response. Top
managers will undertake actions based on their
own interpretations; sense-making processes about
the event follow rather than precede action (Daft
and Weick, 1984). Top managers with proactive
causal logics experiment, test, and probe the environment through action (Chakravarthy, 1982; Daft
and Weick, 1984; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000) and
action outcomes provide feedback about the environmental changes. This proactive and anticipatory
adaptation will considerably increase the speed of
strategic responses initiated by firms in high velocity industries.
Hypothesis 10a (H10a): Top managers’ deterministic
environment-strategy causal logics will be negatively
related to speed of response to both the general sector and the task sector.
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Hypothesis 10b (H10b):Top managers’ proactive environment-strategy causal logics will be positively related to speed of response to both the general sector
and the task sector.
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of differences across the four industries in industry
attributes other than industry velocity.

Time frame and sample selection
Methods
Choice of industries
To test our hypotheses, we needed to identify industries that varied in velocity but were similar on other
dimensions that could confound attention focus,
causal logic, and speed of response. Accordingly,
we selected industries using a two-step process:
First, based on a thorough review of existing literature on industry velocity (Bourgeois and Eisenhardt,
1988; Eisenhardt, 1989; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997;
D’Aveni, 1994; Fines, 1998; Judge and Miller, 1991;
Mendelson and Pillai, 1999; Williams, 1994), we
identified seven high velocity (personal computers,
computer software, toys and games, athletic footwear, semiconductors, movie, and cosmetics) and
six low velocity (aircraft, furniture, steel, ship building, petrochemicals, and paper) industries.
Second, we matched each high velocity industry
with every low velocity industry on nine objective
and four subjective industry attributes that could
potentially confound our results. Objective measures included: capital intensity, R&D intensity, advertising intensity, total shipments, employment,
exports, imports, industry concentration, and munificence (Dess and Beard, 1984). We measured these
variables using industry-level data from COMPUSTAT and U.S. Industry Outlook data published by
U.S. Department of Commerce (1993). For subjective measures, we used the average ratings (based
on a five-point Likert scale) of one industry analyst
and two strategy professors (Kippendorf’s alpha =
0.89) familiar with each industry on four industry
attributes: knowledge intensity, manufacturing intensity, complexity of supply chain, and technology intensity (hi-tech versus low-tech) (Fines, 1998;
Ghemawat and Rivkin, 1999). We computed the Euclidean distances for each industry pair (high velocity-low velocity) and chose two pairs that had the
minimum distance: semiconductor-aircraft and cosmetic-petrochemicals. The use of four industries (two
matched pairs) allowed us to isolate the impact of industry velocity on cognition and strategic response
variables, while minimizing the confounding effects

We chose a 25-year period—1970 to 1994—for this
study. Prior work indicates that 25 years is sufficient
to capture the upturns and the downturns in the
performance, growth, technologies, and global competition of the four industries studied here (Bilstein,
1996; Chapman, 1991; Estrin, 1984; Heppenheimer,
1997).
We used three criteria to select firms from the
four industries (four-digit Standard Industrial Classification codes). First, strategy studies have stressed
that it is important to select nondiversified firms in
studies making cross-industry comparisons because
the effects of industry characteristics (such as industry velocity) on cognition (Huff, 1982) and strategy variables (Gupta, 1988; Rajagopalan and Datta,
1996) can be more directly assessed for nondiversified firms. Hence, we restricted our sample to firms
deriving at least 70 percent of their sales revenues
(Rumelt, 1974) from their primary business for the
entire time period of the study (1970–1994). Second,
strategy studies have underscored that relationships between industry characteristics and individual firm behavior are likely to be most pronounced
for the large, principal firms in an industry (Rajagopalan and Datta, 1996; Williamson, 1963). We used
three measures of firm size used most frequently in
previous literature to identify the largest firms in
the four industries from 1970 to 1994—natural logarithm of the number of employees in the firm (Dalton and Kesner, 1983; Guthrie and Olian, 1991), total firm sales in dollars (Rajagopalan and Datta,
1996), and market share (Porter, 1985). Third, variation in attention focus and causal logics and speed
of response can result from maturation of firms
rather than from variation in the industry velocity.
This problem is more likely in younger rather than
older firms (Baron and Bielby, 1980). Firms that are
at least 10-years old are adequately mature (Baron
and Bielby, 1980) and have well developed cognition (Barr, 1998), so we selected firms that were at
least 10-years old.
These diversification, size, and age measures
yielded seven firms in the aircraft industry, seven
firms in the semiconductor industry, five firms in
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the petrochemical industry, and five firms in the
cosmetic industry. Appendix I lists the sample firms
and provides basic demographics on each.
Data sources
Measuring top managers’ cognition is a difficult
task; cognitive structures cannot be measured directly and the very act of asking individuals to reveal their beliefs can change them. This is particularly problematic when asking individuals to recall
the beliefs they held in prior time periods because
memories are often incomplete, misinterpreted, or
mistakenly reported because of the outcomes later
achieved (Bettman and Weitz, 1983). The retrospective bias inherent in interviews is particularly problematic in situations where individuals are asked to
recall information from the distant past, as would be
the case for the type of longitudinal design used in
the present study (Golden 1992).
Prior work has addressed these issues by utilizing written or verbal statements as indirect indicators of top managers’ beliefs or subjective cognitive
representations (Barr et al., 1992; Davis, Diekmann,
and Tinsley, 1994; Fiol, 1994). Of particular relevance to those interested in capturing the beliefs of
the top management of an organization are Letters
to Shareholders (LTS) in company annual reports.
These letters are public statements made by chief executives charged with charting their companies’ futures and are official documents that discuss the strategic themes that top managers believe are important
to the firm (Osborne et al., 2001). While these documentary sources can represent only espoused beliefs rather than the full complement of beliefs that
are held, perhaps unconsciously (Fiske and Taylor,
1991), by top managers, there is reason to believe that
they reflect those beliefs that are at the forefront of
their consciousness as they contemplate the issues of
the time (Erdener and Dunn, 1990). Thus, these documents allow one to capture indicators of top managers’ beliefs in use while avoiding the unintentional
imposition of the researcher’s own beliefs about what
concepts should be important. Researchers have used
LTS to identify corporate strategies (Bowman, 1978;
Miller et al., 1996), assess the causal reasoning of strategic decision makers (Barr et al., 1992; Bettman and
Weitz, 1983; Fahey and Narayanan, 1989), examine
how institutional changes are theorized (Greenwood,
Suddaby, and Hinnings, 2002) and how changes in
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industry regulations are interpreted (Barr, 1998; Barr
and Huff, 1997), and explain cognitive bases of joint
venture activity (Fiol, 1989).
A major criticism of the use of LTS is that they
are written for specific audiences and thus may suffer from attempts at impression management. Previous studies have found this self-serving bias to be
most relevant to statements explaining firm performance—managers attribute positive organizational
outcomes to internal causes and negative outcomes
to external causes (Bettman and Weitz, 1983; Staw,
McKechnie, and Puffer, 1983; Salancik and Meindl,
1984). However, more recent work suggests that
these attribution patterns may represent biases in
the sense-making process, not conscious attempts at
impression management (Huff and Schwenk, 1990;
Clapham and Schwenk, 1991).
Comparisons between the framing in LTS and
framing in internal documents have revealed that
statements concerning non-evaluative issues such
as control, internal/external orientation, and customer orientation were highly consistent across internal and external sources (Fiol, 1995). Because our
study is interested only in the relative focus of representations on different environmental sectors and
on the direction of the environment-strategy relationship, evaluative statements are irrelevant to the
study and we excluded evaluative statements, which
specify a clear positive (e.g., the economic boom has
improved our financial position and given us a competitive edge) or negative evaluation (e.g., the economic downturn created a crisis for our firms) of a
specific environmental event on firm outcomes. We
focused instead on neutral and non-evaluative statements that mentioned specific strategic actions that
firms undertook to respond to environmental events
(e.g., industry sales dropped by 15% … so we cut
costs by 20% by closing down four factories and selling old machinery and equipment). As a result, we
expect that statements in LTS give us a reasonable
reflection of the espoused beliefs held by top managers from our sample firms. To further assess the
appropriateness of this data source, we conducted
checks for consistency, trustworthiness, and time
lag, as follows:
Consistency
It is possible that the role played by top managers
in preparing LTS is limited and so what is reflected
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there is not consistent with the beliefs held by those
managers. However, informal conversations with
executives (Barr et al., 1992) and systematic empirical analyses (Fiol, 1994) suggest considerable top
management involvement and accuracy in the preparation of LTS. Clapham and Schwenk (1991) also
suggest that LTS are closely scrutinized by financial analysts and are therefore too important to be
ignored by top managers. Nevertheless, to check the
consistency of the content of these documents, we
compared their content to the management’s discussion and analysis section of the 10-K forms for our
sample firms over the entire study period. Considered to be a good validation source because their
contents are believed to have high reliability (Glueck
and Willis, 1972), 10-K forms are not created as
means of public communication but rather are written to fulfill Security and Exchange Commission filing requirements. In our analysis, the percentage of
common concepts between LTS and management’s
discussion ranged from 60 percent to 77 percent
(semiconductor industry: mean = 68%, S.D. = 12%;
aircraft industry: mean = 71%, S.D. = 15%; cosmetic
industry: mean = 74%, S.D. = 10%; petrochemical
industry: 67%, S.D. = 15%), suggesting satisfactory
consistency in content between the two documents
(Carley and Palmquist, 1992). We also found high
correlations (ranging from 0.47, p < 0.05 to 0.74, p <
0.0001) between the frequencies of concepts appearing in the LTS and in management’s analysis, suggesting consistency in the relative emphasis given to
different concepts across the two documents (Carley
and Palmquist, 1992).
Trustworthiness of information
We asked two industry analysts to rate each of
the 24 sampled companies for the level of trustworthiness of information disclosed in the LTS on
a five-point scale (1 = highly untrustworthy and 5
= highly trustworthy) for five different time periods (1970–1975, 1975–1980, 1980–1995, 1985–1990,
1990–1994). The analysts were asked to focus on
misrepresentation of facts as well as framing of
the information. None of the 24 sampled firms received a rating of “untrustworthy” or “highly untrustworthy” for the period of our study. The mean
of the trustworthiness ratings was 3.9 and the standard deviation was 0.90.
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Time lags
Expression in an LTS may lag considerably behind
an actual strategic action. To check for such lags,
we collected announcements of 15 specific events
(e.g., mergers, acquisitions, divestiture) made by
the firms in The Wall Street Journal (1970–1994) and
then matched the date of an announcement with
the mention of the same event in the LTS. A time
lag existed if the event was not reported in the LTS
for the same year as the event was announced in
The Wall Street Journal. None of the firms had time
lags for more than 15 percent of the events in the 25
years. Thus, time lag was not an issue for the current sample.

Constructing causal maps
To measure attention focus and causal logics of top
managers, we first elicited top managements’ causal
maps of their environments from annual reports.
The causal mapping technique is a form of content
analysis that isolates causal assertions within a document (Axelrod, 1976). Use of causal mapping is consistent with the assertion that causal reasoning is the
primary way in which strategic decisions are developed and understood (Barr et al., 1992; Huff, 1990).
As noted earlier, content analysis of archival documents is especially useful in our study because it
avoids the recall bias that plagues interviews (Axelrod, 1976) especially when, as in this case, the study
covers longitudinal time frames. Moreover, causal
mapping provides detailed, rigorously collected information about cognitive structures that is not typically found in case studies (Barr, 1998).
Following Axelrod (1976), we developed causal
maps from the LTS in a four-step procedure illustrated in Appendix II. In the first step, two raters
(not authors) familiar with the area of strategic management independently identified statements that
clearly contained a cause-effect relationship between
environment and strategy variables from the LTS
using key words such as “if-then,” “because,” “so,”
“as.” We did not provide any formal definitions of
“environment” and “strategy” to the raters to minimize intrusiveness in eliciting raw phrases (Barr et
al., 1992; Fahey and Narayanan, 1989). We assessed
their interrater reliability using Kendall’s coefficient
of concordance (W = 0.88).
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In the second step, raw causal maps were created.
This process involves deciding which part of the text
to code, and what words to use in the coding scheme.
To identify which part of the text to code, the same
two raters separated the causal statements identified in the first step into “causes” and “effects” to
build the “raw causal maps.” Carley and Palmquist
(1992) argue that aggregation reduces misclassification of concepts due to peculiar wording by individuals, so to decide what words to use in the coding scheme, three experienced coders (not authors
or original coders) independently coded the original cause and effect phrases in the LTS identified by
the two raters into 48 common “raw environmental
concepts” and 59 “raw strategy concepts” (W = 0.91)
that were close in meaning to the original phrases in
the annual reports. To avoid coder bias, text distortion and comparative incongruence, the coders used
the rule “denotation rather than interpretation.” We
used the “majority rule” to resolve disagreements
between the coders (Carley and Palmquist, 1992).
We also consulted industry and strategy experts to
ensure the 107 raw concepts were distinctive and at
the same level of abstraction.
In the third step, we used existing theoretical
frameworks to organize the 107 raw concepts into
broad conceptual categories representing environment and strategy. Generalization of similar concepts using theoretical frameworks enables researchers to set up a common basis to compare
causal maps across diverse topical contexts (e.g.,
high and low velocity industries) and increases the
relevance and validity of the emergent concepts by
ensuring that the categories are distinct and uniform
in breadth and abstraction (Carley and Palmquist,
1992; Fahey and Narayanan, 1989).
To categorize environmental concepts, we used
extant frameworks of the general and task sectors
(Bourgeois, 1980; Daft et al., 1988; Garg et al., 2003).
We classified concepts relating to macroeconomic
(e.g., domestic recession, global recession, international currency exchange rates, and Asian financial
crises), political (e.g., change in political administration, change in government policies, changes in
world trade organization policies, European Union
charter, and international U.S. relations), and regulatory variables (e.g., environmental laws relating
to reduction in noise and pollution levels) under
the general sector. We grouped concepts relating to
competition (e.g., imitators, new entrants, decline in
barriers to entry, global competition, cooperative al-
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liances of competitors), supplier (e.g., scarcity of raw
materials, supplier dominance, diversity of suppliers), customer (e.g., market fragmentation, growth
of specific markets, convergence of markets, shifts
in customer demand), and technology (e.g., product
innovation, diffusion of technological know-how,
technological transitions) under the task sector. We
show our coding list in Appendix III.
Organizational strategy consists of both content
(the “what” of strategy) and process (the “how”
of strategy) and we sought to include indicators of
both in this study. We used prominent strategy content (Porter, 1985; Rumelt, 1974) and process (Mintzberg, 1972; Reger and Huff, 1993) frameworks to
comprehensively categorize firm strategies mentioned in the LTS. We used Porter’s (1985) contentbased framework to organize corporate strategy
concepts and the competitive action classification
(Ferrier, 2001; Ferrier, Smith, and Grimm, 1999) to
organize competitive strategies. We used a variety
of sources including popular text books (Hitt, Ireland, and Hoskisson, 2004), classic books (Hofer and
Schendel, 1978), and process related review (Reger
and Huff, 1993) and empirical (Mintzberg, 1972) papers to develop a comprehensive classification of
strategy process concepts.
We validated these environmental and strategy
categories using the sorting technique suggested by
Anderson and Gerbing (1991). Three strategy professors and four industry analysts classified the 48
environmental concepts into general and task sector categories and the 59 strategy concepts into strategy content and process categories (W = 0.89). We
used the majority rule in categorizing concepts for
which the agreement was not 100 percent (Carley
and Palmquist, 1992) and utilized only those concepts agreed to by four or more raters.
For illustrative purposes, Figure 2 shows parts of
the causal maps of a firm in low velocity industry
and a firm in high velocity industry.
Measures
Industry velocity
Industry velocity comprises both rate (speed) and
volatility (unpredictability) of changes in industry
variables (Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1988; Brown
and Eisenhardt, 1997; Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt
and Martin, 2000). We used three established and
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Figure 2. Illustration of parts of the causal maps of a firm in low velocity industry and a firm in high velocity
industry

validated measures of rate of industry change: number of new products introduced, time span (number of years) between new products introduced,
and depreciation rates of capital equipment (coefficient alpha = 0.92) (Fines, 1998; Katila and Ahuja,
2002; Martin and Mitchell, 1998; Mendelson and Pillai, 1999; Nerkar and Roberts, 2004). We used trade
and industry-specific journals and manufacturer’s
catalogs to gather information on the number and
number of years between new product introductions. Consistent with previous studies on industry velocity (Fines, 1998; Mendelson and Pillai, 1999)
and new product introductions (Katila and Ahuja,
2002; Martin and Mitchell, 1998; Nerkar and Roberts, 2004), we focused on individual products introduced rather than categories of new products introduced. We computed the average depreciation

rates for each industry based on the 10-K forms of
incumbent firms in the industry. The results of Wilcoxon1 sign rank tests confirmed that both semiconductor and cosmetic industries had higher numbers
of new product introductions, shorter spans of intervals between new product introductions, and lower
1 The semiconductor industry had higher velocity than the aircraft (new product introductions: Z = 4.53, p < 0.001; span of
intervals: Z = 5.95, p < 0.001; depreciation rates: Z = 3.89, p
< 0.001); and the petrochemical (new product introductions:
Z = 5.28, p < 0.001; span of intervals: Z = 5.31, p < 0.001) industries. The cosmetic industry also had higher velocity
than the aircraft industry (new product introductions: Z =
4.15, p < 0.001; span of intervals: Z = 4.79, p < 0.001; depreciation rates: Z = 3.59, p < 0.01). Differences in rate of industry change measures of the semiconductor and cosmetic, and
the aircraft and petrochemical industries not significant.
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Table 1. Major events in the general sectors of the four industries: 1970 to 1994
Environmental sector

Type of change

Number of changes
Aircraft
industry

General sector

Task sector

Semiconductor
industry

Petrochemical
industry

Cosmetic
industry

Macroeconomic
Political
Regulatory
Total changes

3
3
1
7

3
2
2
7

3
2
3
8

3
2
3
8

Customers
Competitive
Technological
Total changes

1
2
1
4

2
4
5
11

1
2
2
5

2
4
4
10

depreciation rates of capital equipment than aircraft and petrochemical industries for the years
1970 to 1994.
We measured volatility using a variation of the
environmental volatility measure developed by
Dess and Beard (1984). We calculated volatility by
regressing a variable for each year on a variable for
net industry sales (Bergh and Lawless, 1998). We
ran 25 different equations in each industry to estimate volatility for each of the 25 years (1970–1994).
For example, we used net industry sales from 1965
to 1970 to predict volatility in 1970 and so on. Following the equation yt = b0 + b1t + at, where y is industry sales, t is year, and a is the residual, volatility
was the standard error of the regression slope coefficient divided by average sales. Larger values of volatility point to greater environmental unpredictability (Bergh and Lawless, 1998; Dess and Beard, 1984).
The results of Wilcoxon sign rank tests2 confirmed
that both the semiconductor and cosmetic industries
were more volatile than aircraft and petrochemical
industries.
The rate and volatility measures were highly correlated (ranging from 0.64 to 0.88). Therefore, we
created a composite measure of industry velocity by averaging the z-scores of rate and volatility
measures. We measured the industry velocity measures (t) in the year preceding the year in which we
2 The semiconductor industry had significantly higher volatility than the aircraft (Z = 3.78, p < 0.001) and the petrochemical (Z = 4.25, p < 0.001) industries. The cosmetic industry also
had significantly higher unpredictability than the aircraft (Z
= 3.25, p < 0.001) and the petrochemical (Z = 4.21, p < 0.001)
industries. Differences in the unpredictability of the semiconductor and cosmetic, and the aircraft and petrochemical
industries were not significant.

measured the attention focus and causal logic variables (t + 1).
Environmental events
We identified major events in the general and task
sectors of the aircraft, petrochemical, semiconductor, and cosmetic industries (Bourgeois, 1980; Daft et
al., 1988; Garg et al., 2003). Table 1 shows the number of events identified in the general and task sectors for each industry. For the general sector, we
triangulated industry histories (Bilstein, 1996; Chapman, 1991; Estrin, 1984; Heppenheimer, 1997), trade
journals and reports (U.S. trade outlook, 1994, 2000),
and interviews with industry consultants to identify
major events in the macroeconomic (e.g., domestic
recession in 1990, Asian financial crisis in 1997), political (e.g., Persian Gulf War in 1991, and changes in
bilateral trade agreements between the United States
and Japan in 1985 and 1988), and regulatory (e.g.,
deadlines for completion of phase I and II of reduction in noise and pollution emission levels for aircrafts, upgrading of material standards for the cosmetic industry) arenas of the four industries.
We identified major events in the task sectors of
the four industries based on indicators of changes
in competitive, customer demand, and technology variables. We used changes in five indicators to identify changes in competition: capital intensity, R&D intensity, advertising intensity, value of
imports, and value of exports. A major decrease in
capital intensity, R&D intensity, and advertising
intensity implies that barriers to entry decline significantly, thereby resulting in significant increase in
new entrants and competition and/or a major shift

E n v i r o n m en t a l C o n t e x t , M a n a g e r i a l C o g n i t i o n ,

and

in competition (Hill and Hansen, 1991). The value of
imports and exports represents the degree of global
competition in an industry; a major change in either variable suggests a significant shift in the scope
of competition (Hambrick and Lei, 1985). We measured shifts in demand through significant changes in
industry sales (value of total shipments) (Dess and
Beard, 1984). Significant increase or decline in industry growth rate represents major shifts in industry munificence.
We used an auto correlation function (ACF) plot
to identify significant changes in the five competition variables and in changes in industry sales
(Eye, 1990). An ACF represents correlations of a series with lagged values of itself. It is especially useful in diagnosing outliers or unpredictable values
in the time series. Yearly changes in which the standard error values were outside of the 95 percent
confidence interval as assessed by the auto correlation function (ACF) were identified as major competitive changes.
Technology changes are also an integral part of
a firm’s task sector (Tushman and Anderson, 1986;
Tushman and Romanelli, 1994). We used Tushman and Anderson’s (1986) definition to identify
technological shifts—end of an era of convergence
and emergence of new technologies that either significantly improve or completely replace existing technologies. A review of industry analysis reports by the U.S. Department of Commerce (1994,
1997) (U.S. Industrial Outlook, 1994, U.S. Industry
& Trade Outlook, 1997) and history books (Bilstein,
1996; Chapman, 1991; Estrin, 1984; Heppenheimer,
1997) on the four industries led us to identify one
technological shift in the aircraft industry (1994–
1995: introduction of the revolutionary high-speed
civil transport); five shifts in the semiconductor industry (1983–1984: dynamic random access memory (DRAM) technology; 1986–1987: focus on
non-DRAM technologies; 1989–1990: erasable programmable memory chips (EPROM) technology;
1993–1994: convergence of computing and communications technologies creating mobile computing and personal conferencing products; and 1997–
1998: introduction of “hybrid applications” such as
multimedia applications) (Goldstein and Aspray,
1997; U.S. Department of Commerce, 1993 [Industrial Outlook, 1993: chap. 15]); four shifts in the
cosmetic industry (1975–1977: automated cosmetic
manufacturing technologies; 1980–1982: shift from
metal to laminated plastic packaging technology;
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1985–1987: introduction of synthetic base materials; 1992–1994: animal testing alternative technologies); and two shifts in the petrochemical industry
(1974–1976: plate tectonic and jet drilling technologies; 1992–1994: basin simulation, 3D seismic and
tertiary recovery technologies).
We validated the technology shifts in each industry using one industry analyst and two professors
specialized in corresponding industry research. We
provided the experts with a list of individual product and process innovations in the industry and
asked that they classify them into major and minor
innovations from 1970 to 1994. The “major” innovations identified by the experts matched the technology shifts identified through archival sources.
Attention focus
We measured attention focus by the network-based
measures of centrality of the concepts in the LTS.
Centrality reflects the degree to which a concept
dominates the causal relationships in a cause map;
the greater the centrality of a concept, the greater
the attention focus around that concept in the map
(Carley and Palmquist, 1992; Eden et al., 1992; Knoke
and Kuklinski, 1982). We used two network-based
measures of centrality—degree (how well connected
a given concept is within a network) and closeness
(how close a given concept is to other concepts in
the network). We computed centrality measures using the Netanalysis software (Fahey and Narayanan,
1989; Nadkarni and Narayanan, 2005), which uses
standard social network algorithms (Borgatti, 2005;
Freeman, 1978/1979; Knoke and Kuklinski, 1982).
Degree centrality focuses only on direct or adjacent paths of a concept with other concepts in the
network. Degree centrality is computed as (Borgatti,
2005; Freeman, 1978/1979; Scott, 2000):

where:
CD(Pk) = number of concepts connected to
concept k
a(pi, pk) = connection from pi to pk (either 0 or 1)
n = number of concepts in the causal map
The closeness centrality is obtained by using the
shortest paths from the focal concept to reach all
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other concepts in the network as follows (Freeman,
1978/1979; Nieminen, 1974):

factors influencing it. It is computed as (Freeman,
1978/1979; Scott, 2000):

where:

where:
CDI(Pk) = number of concepts going into concept
k
DI(pi, pk) = distances: shortest number of paths
through which concepts in the network
go into concept pk
n = number of concepts in the causal map

CD(Pk) = number of concepts connected to
concept k
d(pi, pk) = distances: shortest number of paths
that concept pi has to go through to reach
each concept in the network
n = number of concepts in the causal map
Appendix IV illustrates the degree and closeness centrality measures for a causal map comprising four concepts (A, B, C, and D). Concept C is the
most central concept in the network based on degree (1.0) as well as closeness (1.0) centrality because
it is most connected and has the shortest distance
to other concepts in the network. Following previous studies, we represented centrality of the task
or general sector by the centrality score of the most
central concept in each environmental sector (Carley and Palmquist, 1992; Eden et al., 1992; Knoke
and Kuklinski, 1982). Because the degree and closeness measures of centrality were highly correlated,
we created a composite measure of centrality by averaging the Z scores of the two measures. We gathered centrality observations from the LTS for each
year from 1970 to 1994. We lagged the centrality (t
+ 1) measures a year behind the industry velocity (t)
measures.
Proactive and deterministic environment-strategy logics
The managerial cognition literature has defined deterministic logics as environment → strategy links
in the causal maps and proactive logics as strategy
→ environment links in the causal maps (Eden et
al., 1992; Fahey and Narayanan, 1989). Accordingly,
we used in-degree and out-degree analysis (Bougon, Weick and Binkhorst, 1977; Eden et al., 1992;
Ford and Hegarty, 1983; Knoke and Kuklinski, 1982)
of the causal links between environment and strategy in the causal maps to measure levels of proactive and deterministic causal logic. In-degree refers
to the number of direct and indirect causal links going into a concept and is indicative of the degree
to which the concept is contingent on a variety of

A high number of in-degrees for strategy concepts would suggest that firms consider strategy as
primarily an effect of, or response to, environmental concepts in the map representing a deterministic causal logic. Appendix IV shows that concepts
C and D have high in-degrees, whereas concepts A
and B have zero in-degrees.
For our study, high number of in-degrees for environmental concepts would suggest that strategies
influence the environment and thus represents proactive causal logic, whereas the in-degrees for strategy concepts would suggest that environment affects
strategies, suggesting a deterministic causal logic.
Out-degree refers to the number of links going
out of a concept and is indicative of the degree to
which a concept influences other concepts in the
frame. Out-degree is computed as follows (Freeman,
1978/1979; Scott, 2000):

where:
CDO(Pk) = number of concepts coming out of
concept k
DO(pi, pk) = distances: shortest number of paths
through which concept pk goes into other
concepts in the map
n = number of concepts in the causal map
Concepts with high out-degree are primarily
causal or influential variables that pose contingencies to other concepts in the map. In Appendix IV,
concepts A and B have high out-degrees, whereas D
has no out-degrees.
For our context, high out-degrees for environmental concepts suggest that firms perceive the environment as a contingency or a given, implying a
deterministic causal logic. On the other hand, high
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out-degrees for strategy concepts suggest that strategies can influence the environment and are not
merely responses to it. This indicates proactive
causal logic.
Capturing in-degree and out-degree based on the
number of causal links does not capture the relative
importance of the links in the frame. We used the
proportion of proactive (number of strategy → environment links/total links in the causal map) and
deterministic (environment → strategy links/total links in the causal map) causal links to identify
the relative importance of these links (Carley and
Palmquist, 1992; Knoke and Kuklinsky, 1982).
To assess the dimensionality and distinctness of
proactive and deterministic thinking, we conducted
an exploratory factor analysis of the six measures of
proactive and deterministic thinking with varimax
rotation. As expected, the factor analyses yielded
two distinct factors: proactive (eigenvalue: 3.25,
variance 0.45) and deterministic (eigenvalue: 2.48,
variance 0.36) causal logics. The in-degree of environment (0.87), out-degree of strategy (0.91), and
percentage of strategy → environment links (0.95)
loaded highly on factor-1, which we call proactive
causal logic, and had very low loadings on factor2, which we call deterministic causal logic (ranging
from 0.29 to 0.68). Similarly, out-degree of environment (0.93), in-degree of strategy (0.89), and percentage of environment → strategy links (0.88) had high
loadings on deterministic causal logic and low loadings on proactive causal logic (ranging from 0.33 to
0.54). To avoid problems of multicolinearity in our
mediated regression analysis (Achen, 1982), we developed composite measure of proactive causal
logic by averaging the z-scores of in-degree of environment, out-degree of strategy, and percentage of
strategy → environment links. Similarly, we created
a composite measure of deterministic logic by averaging the z-scores of out-degree of environment,
in-degree of strategy, and percentage of environment → strategy links. We gathered the proactive
and deterministic logic observations for each year
from 1970 to 1994. We lagged the causal logic variables (t + 1) by a year behind the industry velocity
(t) measures.
Speed of strategic responses
Previous studies that examine the relationship between environmental beliefs and strategic responses
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contend that it is important to specify a priori the actions that could be considered as responses to specific environmental factors (Barr, 1998; Barr and
Huff, 1997). To identify firm responses to the environmental events identified earlier, we first listed
the strategic actions that were identified in a myriad of secondary sources including 10-K reports,
U.S. Department of Commerce Industry Outlook reports, announcements in The Wall Street Journal, and
published histories of the four industries (Bilstein,
1996; Chapman, 1991; Estrin, 1984; Heppenheimer,
1997) as firm responses to each change in the general and task sectors. There was a high degree of
agreement across the document resources in the actions identified as strategic response (W = 0.85). We
further validated the responses yielded by the secondary sources through consultations with industry analysts. Two industry analysts familiar with
each industry were provided with a list containing the events and the strategic responses derived
from secondary sources and asked to select the actions that they considered were responses to each
specific event. There was a high degree of convergence between two industry analysts for each industry (semiconductor industry: W = 0.79, aircraft
industry: W = 0.85, petrochemical industry: W =
0.82, cosmetic industry: W = 0.77). Disagreements
were resolved through follow-up interviews with
each consultant.
Speed of strategic response was measured as the
number of days between the occurrence of an event
and the initiation of the first strategic response. The
fewer the number of days between the occurrence
of the environmental event and the initiation of the
strategic response, the faster the speed of response.
To ascertain the approximate date when each sampled firm initiated the first strategic response action, we content analyzed articles pertaining to each
of the responses for the sampled firms in the F&S
Predicast database. This comprehensive source consists of news article titles and abstracts from over 700
newspapers, business magazines, trade association
publications, and business newsletters published in
the United States (Ferrier, 2001). Most of these articles consistently specified the exact date of the initiation of the response (day, month, year). To allow us
to make causal inferences, we measured the attention focus and causal logic variables in the year preceding the year in which we measured speed of strategic response.
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Controls
We controlled for five industry variables that may
affect environmental beliefs as well as strategic responses—industry munificence, industry concentration, capital intensity, R&D intensity, and
advertising intensity. Industry growth or munificence—measured as yearly percentage change in industry gross sales (Dess and Beard, 1984)—reduces
the motivation to direct attention to new environmental areas, and engage in aggressive strategic and
competitive behavior (Ferrier, 2001). Slow growth
often causes more intense competition and lower
profitability that motivates paying attention to new
environmental areas and engaging in proactive strategic actions (Porter, 1985). High industry concentration (measured as the ratio of sales for the industry’s top four companies to total industry sales)
limits competitive actions among firms by creating
high barriers to entry and yields higher profits to established firms (Porter, 1985). This limits environmental beliefs and strategic responses to actions that
leverage existing competencies. High capital intensity (capital expenditures divided by sales) requires
firms to invest heavily in long-term assets, which
fosters persistence in environmental beliefs and strategic responses (Dess and Beard, 1984). High R&D
(R&D expenditures divided by sales) and advertising intensity (advertising expenditures divided by
sales) encourages innovation and product differentiation that drive proactive search for new ideas and
new ways of doing things (Rajagopalan and Datta,
1996). We measured these variables in the years preceding the attention focus and causal logic variables
using industry-level data from COMPUSTAT and
U.S. Industry Outlook data published by the U.S. Department of Commerce.
We controlled for two firm-level variables3—sales
growth and past performance changes. Previous
cognition-related studies have consistently identified the crucial role of both sales growth rates and
past performance changes in explaining variations
3 We ran the regressions using three additional firm controls—
size (sales and number of employees), age, and diversification. We also reran the regressions using 23 dummy (0, 1)
variables to control for between-firm differences. However,
because none of these variables had any significant effects in
any regressions, we did not include them in the final analysis. Excluding these nonsignificant control variables allowed
us more degrees of freedom in our analysis.
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in managerial cognition (Finkelstein and Hambrick,
1996; Weick, 1995; Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). Firm
sales growth was defined as the percent change in
the total company sales in the three years preceding the attention focus and causal logic variables adjusted for inflation (Guthrie and Olian, 1991; Rajagopalan and Datta, 1996). For example, for causal logic
variables in 1970, we measured sales growth from
1967 to 1970.
Drawing on a procedure suggested by Venkatraman and Ramanujam (1987), we created a composite measure of past performance change by averaging yearly changes in the values of three financial
measures—return on sales, return on equity, and
return on assets. We conducted sensitivity analysis using one, two, and three-year changes in performance variables. The results from two and three
year changes in past performance variables did not
differ from the results yielded by yearly changes.
Therefore we used yearly changes in performance
preceding the attention focus and causal logic variables. We collected the performance data from annual COMPUSTAT tapes.
Analyses and Results
Analyses
Tests of mediated models in the management literature have been dominated by Baron and Kenny’s
(1986) causal steps approach, but this approach has
been criticized for several shortcomings, including
low power to detect effects and high Type I error
rates. To overcome these problems, recent studies
have proposed bootstrapping procedures for estimating indirect effects of the criterion variables on
the outcome variables through the proposed mediators (see MacKinnon et al., 2002; Shrout and Bolger,
2002). Bootstrapping is a nonparametric approach to
hypothesis testing that, unlike other methods testing
mediation (e.g., Sobel test), imposes no assumptions
about the shapes of the distributions of the variables
or the sampling distribution of the statistic. In the
bootstrapping method, the significance of the indirect paths from the independent variable (industry
velocity) to the dependent variables (speed of strategic responses) through the mediators (attention focus and causal logic variables) is explicitly estimated
by a product coefficient that is a product of the path
coefficient from independent to mediator variables
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and the path coefficient from mediator to the dependent variable.
We used time series cross-sectional (TSCS) regression analysis to estimate the coefficients of the paths
from independent to mediator and from mediator to
the dependent variables using 25 years of data for
the 24 sampled firms. We then used these coefficients
in the bootstrapping method to estimate the significance of the indirect paths from industry velocity
to speed of strategic response through attention focus and causal logic variables. The use of multiple
time periods enhances the reliability of the estimates
of the regression parameters (Greene, 1992). The hypothesized relationships between the study variables
were modeled as separate equations as follows:

The TSCS estimator provides consistent estimates
in the presence of groupwise heteroskedasticity, and
cross-and within-group correlation. The model and
the procedures used are those described in Greene
(1992) and LIMDEP version 7. We checked for multicolinearity in the models by examining the variance inflation factors for each independent variable.
None of the variables were above the recommended
values of 10 (Neter, Wasserman, and Kutner, 1985),
suggesting that multicolinearity was not a major
threat in the regression analysis.

Yit = β′xit + εit, (i = 1, …, N; t = 1, …, T).

The descriptives and intercorrelations among study
variables are shown in Table 2.
The results of the TSCS mediator regression analysis of the impact of industry velocity (independent variable) on top managers’ attention focus and
causal logics (mediators) are shown in Table 3. Of
the controls, R&D intensity has a positive relationship with proactive causal logic (B = 0.22, p < 0.05), a
weak negative relationship with deterministic logic
(B = –0.09, p < 0.10), and no relationship with attention focus. Past performance change has a positive
relationship with proactive causal logic (B = 0.24, p
< 0.001) and a negative relationship with deterministic causal logic (B = –0.21, p < 0.001). The other controls have either a weak relationship (p < 0.10) or no
relationship with the mediator variables.
Industry velocity has a positive relationship with
top managers’ attention focus on the task sector (B
= 0.51, p < 0.001) and a negative relationship with
attention focus on the general sector (B = –0.32, p <
0.001). These results support Hypotheses 1 and 2. Industry velocity has a positive relationship with proactive causal logic (B = 0.34, p < 0.001) and a negative relationship with deterministic causal logic (B =
–0.39, p < 0.001), supporting Hypotheses 3 and 4.
The results of the bootstrapping mediated regression analyses are shown in Table 4. The 95 percent confidence intervals are based on bootstrap estimations with 10,000 replications. Recall that speed
of response is measured as the number of days between the occurrence of the event and initiation of a
response, and therefore has a reverse implication—
the fewer the number of days, the faster the speed
of response. The total effects of industry velocity on

In the first equation, Xit are the control and independent (industry velocity) variables of industry i in the
year t and Yit are the mediator variables (attention focus and causal logics) of firm i in year t +1 (N = 600
firm-years). In the second set of equations, Xit are the
control and independent (industry velocity) variables of industry i in the year t and Yit are the dependent variables (speed of strategic response to general events: N = 178 firm-years, speed of strategic
response to task sector changes: N = 185 firm-years)
of firm i in the year t +2 (following the mediator variables). In the final equation, Xit are the control, independent (industry velocity), and mediator variables
and Yit are the dependent variable (speed of strategic
response to general events: N =178 firm-years, speed
of strategic response to task sector changes: N = 185
firm-years) of firm i in the year t +2. In the final equation, we first entered controls, followed by mediators
(attention focus and causal logics) and finally, the independent variable (industry velocity).
Our data represents TSCS data of 24 firms for 25
years. Efficient and unbiased regression estimation
of such TSCS data consisting of long periods for a
few firms may depend on correction for some problems. We estimated generalized least squares regression models using the LIMDEP software (Greene,
1992) with the TSCS estimator, which corrects for
the following problems:
• groupwise heteroskedasticity, E[e^2(i,t)] = sii,
• cross group correlation, Cov[e(i,t),e(j,t)] = sij,
• within group autocorrelation, e(i,t) = rie(i,t – 1)
+ u(i,t)
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Table 2. Means, standard deviations, and correlation matrix of high and low industries
Variable

Descriptives
Mean

Intercorrelations among study variables

SD

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1. Sales growth 			
—
2. Past performance Δ 			
0.25* —
3. Environment sectors1
—
—
0.11
0.09
—
4. Industry velocity
—
—
0.32*
0.27*
0.29* —
5. Attention focus: general
0.27
0.01
0.12
0.25* –0.31* –0.39*** —
sector3 								
6. Attention focus: task
0.05
0.02
0.21
0.22†
0.28*
0.45*** –0.23* —
sector4 										
0.41*** –0.18*
0.24* —
7. Proactive causal logics
0.19
0.07
0.13
0.24*
0.18†
†
8. Deterministic causal logics
0.21
0.10
0.25
–0.27* –0.21† –0.38*** 0.22* –0.21* –0.32** —		
9. Speed of strategic
25.19
10.08
0.13
0.10
0.05
0.21† –0.10
0.18†
0.20† –0.12
—
responses
†

p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
Environment sectors: general sector = 0, task sector = 1

Table 3. TSCS regression results of the effect of industry velocity (independent variable) on attention focus and causal logics
(mediator variables)
Independent variable

Proactive logic
(n = 600)
B

SE B

Deterministic logic
(n = 600)
B

SE B

Attention focus
on task sector
(n = 600)
B

SE B

Attention focus on
general sector
(n = 600)
B

Controls
Industry controls:
Capital intensity
0.14
0.11
0.19
0.14
0.22†
0.10
0.11
R&D intensity
0.22*
0.07
–0.09†
0.02
0.02
0.01
0.15
Advertising intensity
0.15†
0.04
–0.17†
0.03
0.18
0.11
0.14
†
Industry concentration
–0.09
0.02
0.27†
0.11
0.12
0.07
0.24
Industry munificence
–0.18†
0.07
0.05
0.03
0.07
0.09
0.07
Firm controls1: 								
Sales growth
0.12†
0.04
0.25†
0.12
0.21†
0.07
0.14
Past performance Δ
0.24*
0.09
–0.21*
0.07
0.12†
0.05
0.11
ΔR2
0.11 		
0.14		
0.09		
0.07
Industry velocity
0.34***
0.05
–0.39***
0.04
0.51***
0.07
–0.32***
ΔR2
0.17***		
0.21***		
0.24***		
0.19***

SE B

0.05
0.12
0.12
0.19
0.11
0.17
0.08
0.04

TSCS regression results of the effect of industry velocity (independent variable) on attention focus and causal logics (mediator variables)
† p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
1 We created 23 dummy variables to control for firm differences. The results presented in the table are after controlling for
the firm dummy variables

speed of response to general sector changes (B = –
0.24, p < 0.001; 95% CI = 0.029, 0.181) as well as on
speed of response to task sector changes (B = –0.15,
p < 0.001; 95% CI = 0.019, 0.197) are significant. The
indirect effects of industry velocity on speed of response to general sector changes through attention
focus on general sector (B = –0.25, p < 0.001; 95%
CI = 0.051, 0.189), attention focus on task sector (B

= –0.17, p < 0.001; 95% CI = 0.017, 0.125), proactive
logic (B = –0.41, p < 0.001; 95% CI = 0.062, 0.171),
and deterministic logic (B = –0.29, p < 0.001; 95% CI
= 0.045, 0.289) are all significant. Similarly, the indirect effects of industry velocity on speed of response
to task sector changes through attention focus on
general sector (B = –0.35, p < 0.001; 95% CI = 0.064,
0.358), attention focus on task sector (B = –0.22,
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Table 4. Results of bootstrapping mediation regression analysis for the relationships between industry velocity, attention
focus, causal logics, and speed of strategic response
Independent and mediator
variables

Speed of response to general
sector changes
B

Total effects
Industry velocity
Direct effects
Industry velocity
Indirect effects
Attention focus
Attention focus on general sector
Attention focus on task sector
Causal logics
Proactive logics
Deterministic logics

Speed of response to task
sector changes

S EB

95% CI

B

S EB

95% CI

–0.24***

0.03

0.029, 0.181

–0.15***

0.02

0.019, 0.197

–0.17

0.22

–0.037, 0.156

–0.09

0.11

–0.007, 0.054

–0.25**
–0.17***

0.03
0.02

0.051, 0.189
0.017, 0.125

–0.35**
–0.22***

0.07
0.03

0.064, 0.358
0.091, 0.314

–0.41***
–0.29***

0.05
0.03

0.062, 0.171
0.045, 0.289

–0.15***
–0.25***

0.02
0.03

0.051, 0.326
0.153, 0.294

** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
Table 5. TSCS regression results of attention focus and causal logics (mediators) and speed of response (dependent
variable)
Controls
Speed of
response to
general events1
(n = 178)
B

SE B

Mediators

Speed of
response to
task events1
(n = 180)
B

SE B

Controls:
Capital intensity
0.14†
0.05
0.22†
0.09
R&D intensity
–0.09†
0.04
–0.05*
0.01
Advertising intensity
–0.11†
0.05
–0.07
0.09
Industry concentration
0.02
0.01
0.14†
0.06
Industry munificence
0.17
0.12
0.09
0.05
Firm sales growth
0.22*
0.04
0.18*
0.04
Past performance Δ
0.14*
0.02
0.24*
0.07
ΔR2
0.09† 		
0.12† 		
Independent variable:
Industry velocity 					
ΔR2 					
Mediating variables:
Proactive logic 					
Deterministic logic 					
Attention focus on general sector 					
Attention focus on task sector 					
ΔR2 					

Speed of
response to
general events1
(n = 178)
B

SE B

Speed of
response to
task events1
(n = 180)
B

S EB

0.04
0.05
–0.17
0.14
–0.10
0.06
0.05
0.09
0.12
0.15
0.04
0.05
0.09
0.12
0.05 		

0.02
–0.11
–0.08
0.11
0.10
0.01
0.03
0.04

0.05
0.15
0.12
0.06
0.13
0.00
0.07

–0.07
0.04
0.06† 		

–0.10
0.05

0.07

–0.24*** 0.03
0.15*** 0.02
–0.03*** 0.00
0.17*** 0.02
0.21*** 		

–0.19***
0.05***
0.07***
–0.20***
0.17***

0.02
0.00
0.00
0.03

1

Speed of response variables have a reverse interpretation—the fewer the number of days between occurrence of general
and task events and the initiation of strategic responses, the higher the speed of response and vice versa.
† p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

p < 0.001; 95% CI = 0.091, 0.314), proactive logic (B
= –0.15, p < 0.001; 95% CI = 0.051, 0.326), and deterministic logic (B = –0.29, p < 0.001; 95% CI = 0.153,

0.294) are also significant. Moreover, the direct effects of industry velocity (after entering the mediators) on both speed of response to general sector
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changes (B =0.17, n.s.; 95% CI = –0.037, 0.156) and
speed of response to task sector changes (B = 0.09,
p < 0.001; 95% CI = –0.007, 0.054) are nonsignificant.
This suggests that attention focus and causal logic
variables completely mediate the relationships between industry velocity and speed of response to
general and task sector changes and support Hypotheses 5, 6, 7, and 8.
To understand the nature of mediation, we estimated the impact of attention focus and causal logic
variables on speed of responses. These results are
shown in Table 5.
Attention focus on the general sector has a positive relationship (negative coefficient: B = –0.03, p <
0.001) with speed of response to general events, and
a negative relationship (positive coefficient: B = 0.07,
p < 0.001) with speed of response to task events, providing support for Hypotheses 9a and 9b, respectively. In contrast, attention focus on the task sector
has a positive coefficient (B = 0.17, p < 0.001), implying a negative relationship with speed of response
to general events and a negative correlation (B = –
0.20, p < 0.001), suggesting a positive relationship
with speed of response to task events, which supports Hypotheses 9c and 9d, respectively. Together,
the block of attention focus and causal logic variables explains significant incremental variance in
speed of response to general (ΔR2 = 0.21, p < 0.001)
and task (ΔR2 = 0.17, p < 0.001) events.
Proactive logic has a negative coefficient, suggesting a positive relationship to speed of response to
both general (B = –0.24, p < 0.001) and task (B = –
0.19, p < 0.001) events. These results lend support to
Hypothesis 10a. In contrast, deterministic logic has a
positive correlation, suggesting a negative relationship with speed of response to general (B = 0.15, p
< 0.001) and task (B = 0.05, p < 0.001) events. Thus,
Hypothesis 10b is supported.

Discussion
In this study we sought to unite the economic and
cognitive views of strategic action into a more integrated view that takes into account the influence of
each. We developed and tested a mediated model
in which environment is proposed to influence action through the cognitive frameworks held by top
managers. Our results confirm the mediating role of

in

S t r a t e g i c M a n a g e m e n t J o u r n a l 29 (2008)

managerial cognition—industry velocity influenced
attention focus and causal logics, which in turn, influence speed of strategic response to major changes
in the general and task sectors of the environment.
Specifically, industry velocity positively influenced
top managers’ attention focus on task sector and
negatively influenced attention focus on general sector. Similarly, industry velocity has a positive relationship with proactive causal logics (strategy →
environment) and a negative relationship with deterministic causal logics (environment → strategy).
Further, attention focus and causal logics fully mediated the relationship between velocity and speed
of firm response to major changes in the task and
general sectors. These findings have important implications for our understanding of the development
of top managers’ beliefs, the relationship between
those beliefs and strategic action, and bring us closer
to understanding the complex relationship between
industry context, managerial cognition, and strategic action.
Limitations
Our results highlight intriguing relationships between environment, managerial cognition, and organizational response to environmental events. However, before discussing the implications of these
results, it is appropriate to discuss the limitations
inherent in the research design that affect their interpretation. First, the use of LTS and concentration
on attention focus on external environment and environment-strategy assumptions of firms provide a
relatively restricted perspective on managerial cognition. Our focus on a specific type of managerial
cognition was motivated by our desire to study the
cognition for which there was an existing theoretical
basis for expecting a link to environment. Our use of
annual reports follows from the longitudinal design
of the study, which required similar sources of top
management team (TMT) beliefs for 26 firms across
four industries over a 25-year period. For such studies, archival data is most feasible and annual reports have been shown to be an acceptable source
of managerial beliefs in prior research (Barr et al.,
1992; Fiol, 1994). Nevertheless, future study of the
links between environment, cognition, and action
may wish to focus on other types of beliefs (e.g., action scripts, categorization, attention focus on inter-
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nal organizations, etc.) derived from other types of
sources (e.g., internal documents, longitudinal survey techniques).
Interpretation of our results is also limited by the
usual concerns about generalizability. We focused
on the largest and least diversified firms from four
well-established industries. Thus, we can extend our
results only to large firms from industries with similar characteristics. Future work that investigates
the links between environmental context, managerial cognition, and action that focuses on different
industry contexts (e.g., emerging industries, declining industries, service industries), different types of
firms (e.g., small or midsized), and different aspects
of cognitive representations would provide useful
tests of the generalizability of our results.
Implications
Mediating role of managerial cognition
In revealing relationships between industry velocity, managerial cognition variables, and speed of
strategic action, our study represents an initial step
in addressing the disconnect between the industry
structure (Bain, 1956; Mason, 1957; Porter, 1985) and
managerial cognition views (Barr et al., 1992; Bogner and Barr, 2000; Fiol and O’Connor, 2003; Sutcliffe and Huber, 1998) of strategic actions. This is
especially important for the industry velocity context. Empirical studies in this area have revealed differences in the strategic behaviors of firms in high
and low velocity environments, but have ignored
the role of managerial cognition in driving these behaviors (Brown and Eisenhardt 1997; D’Aveni 1994;
Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and Martin 2000; Williams, 1994). Our results extend this research by suggesting that industry velocity affects the attention
focus and causal logics that top managers develop
about their environments, which, in turn, drive the
speed of strategic actions. This pattern is consistent
with the cognitive explanation of strategic actions,
which suggests that incumbent firms enact their environments. However, contrary to prior empirical
research on cognition, which only assumes or implies a link between environment and cognition,
these results highlight how industry context influences managerial cognition. Our results provide explicit evidence that industry forces significantly and
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directly influence the cognition process by shaping
the attention focus and causal logics that managers use to make sense of and act within the environment. Thus, both industry and cognition variables
are critical in developing a comprehensive explanation of strategic action.
The need to take an integrative perspective to the
two views of strategic action was raised by Johnson
and Hoopes (2003) in their simulation study. However our results differ from theirs in an important
way. They found that cognition gains prominence
under conditions of costly search and relatively low
competitive pressures, whereas the role of cognition
is insignificant when competitive pressures increase
and costs of search are lower. Our results reveal an
influence of cognition on strategic action in both high
velocity industries—characterized by strong competitive pressures and low costs associated with experimentation and search (Bogner and Barr, 2000;
D’Aveni, 1994)—and low velocity industries, characterized by relatively low competitive pressures
in which costs associated with experimentation and
proactive search for new strategies are high (D’Aveni,
1994; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). The differences
in the results between our study and that of Johnson and Hoopes (2003) can be attributed to two factors. First, while Johnson and Hoopes (2003) focus
on collective cognition—clusters of shared cognition
among groups of firms in an industry, we focus on specific cognitive structures (attention focus and causal
logics related to the environment) espoused by top
managers from individual firms in different industry
contexts. The results of inquiries into shared cognition may not apply to specific facets of cognition such
as attention focus and causal logics of top managers
in individual firms in an industry. Second, whereas
Johnson and Hoopes (2003) used simulation procedures to test propositions on cognition and industry
structure, we used a field study approach to examine our model. The differences in the empirical approaches may also have contributed to the deviation
in results. In the end, however, both studies point to
the importance of both industry structure and cognition in directing firm action.
Industry context and managerial cognition
Our finding for a direct link between industry velocity and attention focus has implications for the de-
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veloping literature on attention (Ocasio, 1997; Hoffman and Ocasio, 2001). While prior research has
proposed that attention is influenced by organizational processes, resources, and performance (Ocasio, 1997; March and Shapira, 1992), the results of the
present study suggests that industry significantly influences attention focus. This is consistent with Ocasio’s principle of situated attention, which suggests
that attention is context specific. However, Ocasio
focused primarily on firm-level context, whereas the
present study suggests that industry-level context is
also important. Additional research to investigate
the relative influence of industry- and firm-based
contexts, as well as the interaction between the two,
would appear to be warranted.
The prominent role of cognition as well as the differences in the type of cognition in high and low velocity industries demonstrated in this study raises
the interesting possibility that industry velocity is
perpetuated by the beliefs of the TMTs enacting it,
which contrasts with most extant literature on industry velocity. This possibility was raised theoretically by Bogner and Barr (2000) and the pattern of
results found in the present study is consistent with
their arguments. Not only did firms in low velocity industries have a more deterministic perspective than firms in high velocity environments, they
took longer to respond to changes in the task sector than the general sector. Firms in high velocity industries, on the other hand, had very proactive beliefs and responded faster to task sector changes,
intensifying the speed of competition in high velocity industries. As industry velocity represents the
aggregate actions of incumbent firms (Bogner and
Barr, 2000; Fines, 1998), differences in strategic actions of incumbent firms driven by differences in attention focus and causal logic may shape the industry velocity.
Finally, we believe this study is the first to explicitly test for links between industry context and
managerial cognition. While much of the cognition
literature implicitly assumes that cognitive frameworks reflect the unique demands of different industry types, much of the work focuses on levels of
cognitive similarity and difference within industries
(Barr et al., 1992; Sutcliffe and Huber, 1998; Porac et
al., 1995). There is limited empirical evidence of differences in managerial cognitions across industries
(Lant et al., 1992; Sutcliffe and Huber, 1998), but em-
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pirical study focused on identifying systematic differences in managers’ subjective representations of
environment across different industry contexts has
been lacking. The results of this study provide initial confirmation of relationships that are central to
managerial cognition research.
Managerial cognition and strategic action
Our results indicate strong linkages between the attention focus and causal logics developed by top
managers and speed of strategic response to environmental events. Where strategic decision makers’
attention is focused—on task sectors or on general
sectors—affects the speed with which firms respond
to events that occur within those sectors; response
is faster to those events that occur within the sectors on which the frames are focused. Speed of response is also influenced by beliefs regarding the
causal logic linking firm strategy (actions) and environment; deterministic logics (environment → strategy) are associated with slower responses than proactive logics (strategy → environment).
Taken together, these results contribute to our
understanding about the relationship between managerial cognition and strategic response to environmental events. Prior research has linked managerial
cognition to the speed and content of organizational
response to environmental events (Barr and Huff,
1997; Barr et al., 1992; Dutton and Jackson, 1987;
Thomas et al., 1993; Walsh, 1995), but this research
has focused primarily on beliefs related to the issue
or event itself (e.g., a specific regulatory change, a
specific new technology introduced in the industry).
Results of these works suggest, for example, that response is linked to the degree to which the event is
perceived as an opportunity or threat (Dutton and
Jackson, 1987; Thomas et al., 1993) or as having direct negative consequences for firm utility (Barr and
Huff, 1997). The results of the present study suggest
that patterns of managers’ subjective beliefs about
the environment in general, and the relationship of
these beliefs to strategic action, may influence speed
of response independent from any specific beliefs
that may be held about the event itself. This raises
questions concerning the relative influence of beliefs about industry context (e.g., industry velocity)
and beliefs about specific environmental events (e.g.,
a specific regulatory change, a specific new technol-
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ogy) on the speed of strategic response to environmental events. It also extends prior research in specifying the “boundary conditions” that define the
relationship between beliefs of strategic decision
makers and speed of response. Future studies may
want to build on the results yielded by this study to
develop additional boundary conditions for the relationship between beliefs and speed of response.
Industry context and strategic action
Another interesting question raised by these results
concerns the validity of the prescriptive notion that
principal or dominant firms respond quickly and
decisively to environmental events. Our study suggests that firms within a given context are slower to
respond to some environmental events than to others. In high velocity industries, firms responded
more quickly to changes occurring in their task
sectors, while firms in low velocity industries responded more quickly to events in their general sector. All of our firms were principal in their industry
and strong performers, so this result may mean that
a faster response is not always the best, or it may
mean that the notion of “fast” is relative. Because we
did not include smaller or poorer performing firms
in this study, we cannot determine which interpretation is more correct. But this does present an interesting opportunity for future research.
Conclusion
The results of this study suggest that the timing of
strategic response to major environmental events
varies across industry context and that this variation is tied to beliefs and sense-making processes
that vary by industry context. The findings contribute to a more complete understanding of the linkages between environmental context, beliefs, and
firm action and bring us a step closer to reconciling
economic and cognitive explanations for strategic
action.
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Appendix I. Demographic Summary of Sampled Firms
Company

Mean sales $ (1970–1994)
in millions

Aircraft industry
1. Boeing
2. McDonnell Douglas
3. Lockheed Martin
4. Raytheon
5. General Dynamics
6. Northrop Corporation
7. Grumann Aerospace Corporation
Petrochemical industry
1. Dow Chemicals
2. Dupont
3. Sherwin-Williams
4. PPG Industries
5. Ashland
Semiconductor industry
1. Intel
2. Advanced Micro Devices
3. National Semiconductors
4. Texas Instruments
5. LSI Logic
6. Vishay Intertechnology
7. Analog Devices
Cosmetic industry
1. Revlon
2. Avon
3. Colgate-Palmolive
4. Helene Curtis
5. Carter Wallace

Market share
(%)

Mean number of
employees (1970–1994)

12602.88
8966.74
7788.36
5654.73
5106.50
3337.85
2249.748

23.94
17.87
16.06
11.50
11.47
6.30
5.31

104,700
86,919
77,588
65,521
76,099
33,094
27,717

21120.74
27648.16
2877.85
4826.76
6629.63

22.85
26.89
6.12
9.15
8.89

54,108
133,963
18,783
36,034
30,883

2775.47
783.24
1157.1
3077.14
489.45
346.04
354.18

21.35
8.48
8.91
23.67
4.99
3.69
3.89

33,748
13,067
35,701
89,874
9,567
8,926
8,521

2909.32
2547.90
4565.45
851.79
564.54

23.84
17.59
31.89
7.51
5.72

36,533
30,731
38,100
3,918
3,271
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Appendix III. Theoretical Categories Used to Code Raw Environmental and Strategy Concepts in the Causal Maps
General Sector
1. Macroeconomic environment:
• Change in government administration
• Change in government policies
• Recession in the United States
• Global recession
• Asian financial crises
2. Political environment:
• Persian-Gulf War
• International U.S. relations
• Political conflicts and hostilities
• Economic conditions
• Asian financial crisis
3. Regulatory environment:
• Changes in domestic regulations
• Changes in regulations in other countries
• Changes in World Trade Organization (WTO)
regulations
Task Sector
1. Customer/market environment:
• Diversity of market segments
• Growth of specific markets
• Evolving customer demand
• Diverse customer needs within a segment
• Market fragmentation
• Market convergence
• Emerging market segments
• Shifts in buyer demographics
• Emerging buyer preferences
2. Competitive environment:
• Industry concentration
• Importance of brand name
• Ease of exit
• Profit margins
• Resource requirements
• Cost disadvantages independent of size
• Access to distribution channels
• Imitators
• Increased competition from alternative producers
• Cooperative alliances of competitors
• Market saturation
• Global competition
• Decline in barriers to entry
• New entrants
• Closeness of substitute products
• Prices of substitute products
• Performance of substitute products

5. Technological environment:
• Access to technology and know-how
• Intellectual property rights
• Product innovation
• Technological change
• Market innovation
• Diffusion of technological know-how
6. Suppliers
• Scarcity of raw materials
• Supplier dominance
• Diversity of suppliers
Strategy Content
1. Corporate strategy
• Acquisition
• Merger
• Cooperative ties with international firms
• Cooperative agreement with domestic firms
• Joint venture
• Cooperative ties with suppliers
• Turnaround strategy
• Consolidation
• Divestiture/sale of business units
• Business focus versus diversification
• Allocation of resources
• Expansion of product lines
• Nontraditional expansion opportunities
2. Competitive strategy
• Product customization
• On time product deliveries
• Enhanced customer service
• New product introduction
• Product development
• R&D expenditures
• Adapt to new technologies
• Fast introduction of products
• Product technology focus
• Dealer incentives
• Alliances with dealers
• Advertising
• New channels of distribution
• Brand promotion
• Expansion of marketing programs
• Minimum tooling
• Lower inventory levels
• Product delivery on time
• Lower production cost
• Powerful suppliers
• Economies of scale
• Increase productivity

E n v i r o n m en t a l C o n t e x t , M a n a g e r i a l C o g n i t i o n ,

• Lower waste
• Production rates
• Expansion/reduction of manufacturing capacity
• Computerized manufacturing
• New equipment and facilities
• Capital expenditures
• Increased outsourcing
• Reallocation of existing capacity
Strategy Process
3. Organizational structure
• Simplify organizational structures
• Decentralize
• Develop flexible structures
• Delete layers of management

and

Strategic Action

4. People
• Stock incentive programs
• Down-size
• Select, promote, and train employees
• Labor negotiations
5. Business processes
• Simplify business processes
• Promote understanding of long-term objectives
• Improve resource use
6. Strategic controls
• Develop communication systems
• Strengthen control and procedural systems
• Improve reporting systems
• Budget

Appendix IV. Illustration of Centrality, In-Degree and Out-Degree Measures in a Causal Map
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